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1 Introduction
Two features are ubiquitous in employment relationships. First, there is mutual uncertainty
about their match quality, a crucial determinant of productivity.1 The second feature is the
incompleteness of contracts. Contracts are rarely conditioned on all observable aspects of
an employee’s performance: some actions can be difficult to verify in an outside court,
or prohibitively costly to contract on. However, a benefit of the dynamic nature of em-
ployment relationships is that the parties form relational contracts—informal agreements
linking good performance to bonuses and promotion. The goal of this paper is to study the
nature of relational contracts when the parties face uncertainty about their match quality.
For example, suppose Bob and his manager, Ann, perceive that their match quality is
relatively poor. Bob is on the verge of getting fired unless he succeeds in his next project.
If Bob works hard—a costly activity for him—he is more likely to succeed. If he shirks,
indeed, being successful is less likely, but at least Bob would save his effort costs. Should
Bob work hard in order to maximize his chances of staying employed or shirk, since the
relationship is likely to end? Can Ann provide incentives for hard work?
We answer these questions by studying a standard relational contracting setting of per-
fect information between a Ann (the firm) and Bob (the worker) where the parties are
symmetrically uninformed about their match quality. In this framework, Bob’s work plays
a dual role: it produces immediate revenue (output) for Ann. But his output and effort
also produce information about their match quality. Our first contribution is to highlight
the mechanism that leads to systematic distortions in the relational contracts between Ann
and Bob. In short, if the immediate revenue is a strong reason why Ann would have Bob
work hard at the brink of separation, the outcomes are inefficient. On the other hand, if
the primary motive is to acquire information, then the outcomes are efficient. So what
should the parties do when they cannot attain efficiency? Our second contribution answers
this question by providing a full characterization of the optimal relational contract. Most
notably, this characterization reveals that Ann may assign Bob to a less ambitious project
which will not require hard work but will also reveal less information about the future
prospects of the relationship. These relational contracts resemble probationary periods or
“performance improvement plans (PIPs)” that we will expand upon later.
Summary of the framework and results: We study an infinite horizon, discrete time
game between a firm and a worker. In each period, the firm can fire the worker or offer him
1https://hbr.org/2017/06/when-leaders-are-hired-for-talent-but-fired-for-not-fitting-in
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a salary. If the worker accepts the salary, he chooses an observable action. The output is
stochastically determined by the worker’s action and a relationship-specific match quality.
We study the set of all relational contracts, i.e., Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of this game.
Notice that an action produces both output and also information about the match quality.
Hence, actions can be ranked according to their informativeness (in the Blackwell sense)
and their profitability—expected output minus the effort cost of the action. For most of the
paper we analyze an environment with two actions: high and low. We assume that the high
action is more informative as well as more profitable than the low action.
We begin by studying the efficiency of relational contracts. The efficient benchmark is
the solution to the experimentation problem of a planner who maximizes the joint surplus
of the firm and the worker ignoring incentive constraints. It is characterized by a simple
policy—terminate the relationship below a certain cutoff belief about the match quality and
choose the high action above the cutoff.2
We obtain a full characterization of efficiency driven by the interaction between con-
tract incompleteness and learning. Consider the efficient cutoff belief where the planner is
indifferent between the outside options and experimentation. At this belief, the cost of the
worker’s action is exactly offset by the value of experimentation over and above the outside
options. The value of experimentation consists of two parts—contemporaneous output and
the option value of learning. In relational contracts, incentives to choose the high action are
provided via the option value of learning alone. Therefore, if the contemporaneous output
is larger than the outside options, the option value of learning will not offset the costs of
effort. As a result, relational contracts are inefficient. Otherwise, they are efficient. The
way we interpret this, in our original Ann and Bob example, is that whenever the immediate
revenue (contemporaneous output) is sufficiently attractive for Ann, relational contracts are
inefficient. On the other hand, if the option value of learning is sufficiently large, relational
contracts are efficient. One implication of this result is that inefficiency can be mitigated
by increaseing unemployment benefits which would strengthen the outside options.
We proceed to characterize the optimal relational contract in Proposition 3. The contract
exhibits a three-region structure (Figure 1). The players take their outside options at low
beliefs. The worker chooses the low action at intermediate beliefs and the high action at
high beliefs. Despite its inferior profitability and informativeness, the low action offers a
2This is a correlated three-arm bandit problem, the three arms being the high action, the low action and
the outside option. In general, such problems can be analytically challenging. However, since the high action
unambiguously dominates the low action, obtaining the optimal policy is straightforward.
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better alternative to terminating the relationship when the firm cannot credibly promise to
reimburse the worker for the cost of the high action.
Firm and worker
Efficient benchmark
Beliefs
Quit High
Quit Low High
Figure 1: Difference between the efficient benchmark and optimal relational contract
As mentioned earlier, this characterization resembles the performance improvement
plans (PIPs) that are often used in consulting firms.3 In PIPs, struggling employees are
assigned less important roles as a chance to redeem themselves and stay employed before
getting fired. In the optimal relational contract, the low action region can be interpreted as a
PIP. We would like to point out that, unlike other models of relationship building (Watson,
1999, 2002; Halac, 2014), an important implication of our model is that the worker may
move in and out of a PIP multiple times. This is a testable implication of our model.
The intuition behind Proposition 3 is that the high action is used whenever it is incentive
compatible, since it is more informative and more profitable. Hence, the low action is only
optimal at lower beliefs where the high action cannot be incentivized. This intuition is
a correct starting point but is incomplete. In the efficient benchmark, the low action is
never used because, absent incentive constraints, more information is always desirable.
In a relational contract incentive constraints may make information undesirable at some
beliefs.4 This in turn may render the low action superior because it is less informative.
The proof of Proposition 3 obtains the three-region structure by using the algorithmic
procedure by Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990), APS hereafter. We adapt the APS al-
gorithm to show that iterative application of an operator on an appropriate initial function
yields, as a fixed point, the equilibrium surplus function (maximum achievable surplus at
3See https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/tools-and-samples/
how-to-guides/pages/performanceimprovementplan.aspx
4Preference for information is equivalent to the convexity of the surplus function for the optimal relational
contract. As we will see later, the surplus function in the optimal relational contract is generally not convex.
In a special case where all actions are equally informative, such non-convexities do not pose any technical
hurdles and a three-region structure is immediate. See Section 7.4 for details.
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each belief). We demonstrate the use of this approach in two steps—(i) Applying the oper-
ator once on the function obtained in the efficient solution yields a three-region structure;
and (ii) due to our assumptions on the ranking of payoff and informativeness, we obtain
that the three-region structure is preserved upon every subsequent operation. Therefore,
the three-region structure is obtained as a fixed point property. We are optimistic that this
approach could be useful in other settings.
A natural point of inquiry for our model is the effect of increasing patience. There are
typically two kinds of limits that are studied towards this goal. Folk theorems study the
limit as players become arbitrarily patient, leaving the rest of the environment unchanged.
Another source of patience is frequent interaction, i.e., reducing the length of each period.
The literature originating in Abreu, Milgrom, and Pearce (1991) (AMP hereafter) studies
the limiting outcomes of repeated games with imperfect monitoring as the length of a pe-
riod converges to 0.5 Shorter periods increase the effective patience of players, despite a
fixed rate of time discounting. However, they have the additional effect of reducing infor-
mation per period. The frequent action limit and the limit in standard folk theorems are
equivalent in settings of perfect monitoring and complete information. In our setting—
perfect monitoring with uncertainty about match quality—the two limits may no longer be
equivalent. Therefore, we have a rare opportunity to explore both limits in an environment
with perfect monitoring.
Being agnostic about which of the two limits is more natural, in Section 6, we study
both approaches to the patient limit in a unified framework. We consider a sequence of in-
stances of our model with players’ patience increasing along the sequence while the quality
of information may degrade, both measured in per-period terms. We say that the learning
problem is trivial if the limiting optimal policy associated with the efficient outcome in-
volves experimentation at any positive belief. Theorem 1 provides a sharp characterization
of the limiting outcome in the efficient benchmark and in the optimal relational contract.
First, the holdup problem characterizing inefficiency from Proposition 2 persists in the
limit if and only if the learning problem is non-trivial. Second, the triviality of the learning
problem is characterized by the relationship between the rate at which informativeness, as
measured by the variance of the posterior belief, deteriorates, and the rate at which players
become perfectly patient along the sequence of models. Whenever information decays at a
5AMP consider complete information and imperfect monitoring, while our setting has incomplete infor-
mation and perfect monitoring. This distinction gives rise to qualitative differences discussed in detail in
Section 6.
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slower rate than the rate at which impatience vanishes, the learning problem is trivial. Con-
sequently, there is no holdup problem and relational contracts are efficient, consistent with
a folk theorem.6 When information decays at an equal or faster rate, the learning problem
is nontrivial and the holdup problem persists in the limit. Hence, the rate of information
decay determines whether inefficiency can be a robust limiting feature of our model.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the connection
of our work with some existing literature. In Section 3, we describe our game and the
equilibrium concept. Section 4 sets up the preliminary analysis leading to our main results
presented in Section 5. In Section 6 we analyze the limit of our model as the parties become
patient and information may deteriorate. Section 7 details some extensions of the model.
2 Related Literature
The early literature on relational contracts established their efficiency in various settings
of complete and perfect information when the parties are sufficiently patient (Bull (1987),
Thomas and Worrall (1988), MacLeod and Malcomson (1989)). This is no longer true in
settings with private information such as moral hazard and adverse selection (Levin (2003),
Halac (2012)). Our paper shows that incomplete yet public information alone can also
create inefficiencies in relational contracts. Ho¨rner and Samuelson (2013) obtain a similar
type of inefficiency in the version of their model with observable actions, which is a special
case of the class of frequent action models that we consider. In Ho¨rner and Samuelson
(2013) inefficiency always obtains due to specific parametric assumptions (outside options
equal to zero). Our characterization of efficiency shows that this is not true in general and
it identifies the force behind (in)efficiency.
Persistent uncertainty in relational contracts has also been studied by Thomas and Wor-
rall (2010), Kwon (2016) and Malcomson (2016).7 Recently, DeVaro et al. (2018) have
studied relational contracts with moral hazard where a publicly known, exogenously evolv-
ing state affects the future value of the relationship but not the productivity of effort. They
find that the effort is increasing in the state in the optimal relational contract, similar to
our three-region characterization. Unlike these settings, the worker controls the flow of
information through his effort in our environment.
6The closest existing folk theorem to our setting is due to Wiseman (2005) discussed in Section 6.
7Beyond relational contracts, in a repeated Bertrand game with persistent, private cost shocks, Athey and
Bagwell (2008) show that high persistence relative to patience leads to inefficiencies.
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Our conclusions share some similarities with the literature on relationship building that
posits that favourable outcomes are achieved by establishing trust through repeated inter-
actions. Typically, these dynamics are driven by asymmetric information (Ghosh and Ray,
1996; Watson, 1999, 2002; Halac, 2014). McAdams (2011) studies a stochastic partnership
game with an exogenously evolving relationship capital that yields similar dynamics as our
optimal relational contract. While we discuss the contrast in detail after Proposition 3, the
evolution of relationship capital is endogenous in our setting.8
Symmetric uncertainty has traditionally been explored in the career concerns literature
beginning with Holmstro¨m (1999). Typically, the agent is paid his marginal product every
period, which leaves no room for dynamic incentive provision, e.g. backloaded compensa-
tion. Also, the career concerns literature focuses on the signal jamming incentives where
the worker tries to influence the market’s beliefs. When the agent’s action is unobservable,
market driven incentives can give rise to divergent beliefs and, subsequently the ratchet
effect, recently demonstrated by Cisternas (2018). Observable action rules out both sig-
nal jamming and the ratchet effect. In a continuous time environment without transfers,
Kuvalekar and Lipnowski (2016) study a firm-worker relationship with symmetric uncer-
tainty about match quality and observable actions. They show that even with observable
actions, a non-trivial agency problem ensues in a world without commitment. Besides the
lack of transfers, the actions in their environment are costless and they focus on Markovian
equilibria.
Symmetric uncertainty has also garnered attention in the dynamic contracting literature.
With full commitment, the efficient outcome is trivially achieved in our setting. Hence, the
dynamic contracting literature is often concerned with moral hazard. Prat and Jovanovic
(2014) analyzed a continuous time model with Brownian learning, and found that in order
to avoid the ratchet effect (as in Laffont and Tirole (1988) and Bhaskar (2014)) the contract
induces the agent to shirk early on, and when the information about his ability is more
precise, the rewards are more tightly linked to the output. These dynamics are similar to
our findings–under limited commitment a relationship with perceived low match quality
results in low effort and transitions to high effort as prospects improve. Due to the binary
state of the match quality in our model, the signals’ precision does not improve over time,
and we can see switches between high and low effort due to streaks of luck, while Prat and
Jovanovic (2014) obtained a permanent shift to high effort.
8McAdams (2011) also considers a general version where the relationship capital evolves endogenously.
However, he does not obtain a three-region structure as in our Proposition 3.
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Uncertainty about match quality naturally leads to an experimentation problem con-
necting us with Keller et al. (2005), Bolton and Harris (1999) who also have underexperi-
mentation in the strategic interaction. However, in our setting there is no free-rider effect,
which is the main driver of inefficiencies in that literature.
3 Model
We consider an infinitely repeated interaction between a firm (she) and a worker (he), both
risk-neutral. The productivity of their relationship is determined by the quality of their
match, which can be either good or bad. The parties are symmetrically uninformed: they
begin with a common prior p1 ∈ (0, 1) that the match quality is good. Time is discrete and
denoted by t = 1, 2, ... The firm and the worker have outside options of v and u per period,
respectively. Let s = u+ v be the sum of their outside options.
The timing within a period t is shown in Figure 2. At the beginning of the period
the firm and the worker share a common belief pt that the match quality is good. The
firm decides whether to continue interacting with the worker (dft = 1) or to terminate
the relationship by firing the worker (dft = 0). If she interacts, she offers a wage wt to
the worker. The worker decides whether to accept the offer (dwt = 1) or terminate the
relationship by quitting the firm (dwt = 0). If the parties terminate the relationship, they
receive their outside options in all remaining periods, starting from the current one.9 If,
instead, a wage offer is accepted, the wage is paid to the worker and he chooses a level of
effort (et), which can be High (H) or Low (L) and is observed by the firm.10 Effort is not
contractible, so the worker is free to choose any level of effort, regardless of the wage he
accepted. The cost of H to the worker is c > 0, while the cost of L is 0.
Effort
Match
quality Good Bad
High γH βH
Low γL βL
Table 1: Probability of a success given effort and match quality.
9Allowing the parties to suspend the relationship for a finite number of periods, instead of terminating
it, would not affect the equilibrium outcome. This follows from the existence of an equilibrium where both
parties receive their outside options in all periods.
10Allowing the firm to pay a bonus at the end of the period does not change the model, as the bonus can be
factored into the next period’s wage.
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The outcome of the worker’s effort is either a success (high output) (yt = yh) or a failure
(low output) (yt = yl < yh). The probability of success when the worker’s effort is e is
given by γe when the match quality is good and βe when the match quality is bad, as shown
in Table 1. Given a prior p and effort e ∈ {H,L}, let pie(p) and Re(p) denote, respectively,
the expected probability of success and the expected output in the current period. Then
pie(p) = pγe + (1− p)βe
Re(p) = pie(p)yh + (1− pie(p))yl
Since all actions are publicly observable, the firm and the worker form a common pos-
terior pt+1 at the end of period t. Let φ+e (p) (resp. φ−e (p)) be the posterior belief following
effort e and success (failure) when the prior at the beginning of the period was p. According
to Bayes’ rule,
φ+e (p) =
pγe
pγe + (1− p)βe φ
−
e (p) =
p(1− γe)
p(1− γe) + (1− p)(1− βe) . (1)
In addition, we allow for public randomization. Formally, at the beginning of each
period the parties observe the realization xt of a random variable uniformly distributed on
[0, 1]. This is a common convenience in the literature, as it convexifies the equilibrium set
of payoffs.
Prior p
F offers
wage wt
W accepts
or rejects
the offer.
F pays
wage wt
W chooses an
action- High or
Low.
Move to the
next period
with posterior
p′
F decides
whether to
fire or not.
Output is realized
Posterior updated
to p′.
Figure 2: Timeline of one period
3.1 Assumptions
The following assumptions define our baseline model and will be maintained throughout
Sections 4, 5, and 6. They are visualized in Figure 3
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0 1
βH − c
βL
s
γH − c
γL
RH(p)− c
RL(p)
p
Figure 3: Myopic surplus as a function of beliefs.
Assumption 1. RH(1)− c > s > RH(0)− c > RL(0) and s > RL(1) > RL(0).
Assumption 2. If βH = βL = 0, then γH > γL. Otherwise, γHβH >
γL
βL
.
The assumptions imply the following:
1. H generates more expected surplus (output net of cost of effort) than L regardless of
the match quality.
2. H generates more (less) expected surplus than the outside options when the match
quality is good (bad).
3. L generates less expected surplus than the outside options regardless of the match
quality.
4. H is more informative than L in the sense of Blackwell (1953), which means that
φ+H(p) ≥ φ+L(p) ≥ p ≥ φ−L(p) ≥ φ−H(p) for all p.
Finally, we assume that players are patient enough to sustain H in equilibrium when
the match quality is good. Without this assumption the unique equilibrium would involve
the players taking the outside option at every belief.
Assumption 3. δ [RH(1)− c− s] ≥ (1− δ)c.
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3.2 Discussion of the model
In the baseline model we assume that the match quality, realized at the beginning of the
relationship, is static. This need not be the case. The match quality can change when firms
undergo technology shocks, changes in management, or market conditions. To model these
scenarios we could assume that the match quality evolves exogenously according to some
Markov process. Such evolution would not change the structure of our analysis and the
results. This is because, even though the environment is changing, the players observe
the same signals regarding its evolution. Therefore, they share the same beliefs regarding
match quality at all points in time.
Our model can also accommodate a setting, wherein the worker is assigned projects by
the firm. Suppose the firm can assign either a big or a small project to the worker each
period. Big projects carry more responsibility, e.g. managing teams, dealing with clients
etc. Small projects can be back-office jobs. The worker chooses his effort on the project.
Big projects, due to greater responsibility, can succeed only if the worker exerts high effort.
In that case, the probabilities of success are γH and βH respectively depending on whether
the match is good or bad. The probability of success for the small projects is γL and βL
depending on whether the match is good or bad regardless of the choice of action. In this
framework, the analysis and the results remain identical to the baseline model.
3.3 Strategies and Equilibrium
We denote by ht := {xt, wt, et, yt} the history in stage t if the relationship has not been
terminated. Let ht := {hτ}t−1τ=1 be the history at the beginning of period t if the relationship
has not been terminated. LetHt be the set of histories up to time t.
A strategy for the firm is a sequence of functions {Dft ,Wt}∞t=1, where Dft : Ht ×
[0, 1]→ {0, 1} and Wt : Ht × [0, 1]→ R determine the interaction decision and the wage
offer as a function of the history in previous stages and the public random variable in the
current stage. Similarly, a strategy for the worker is a sequence of functions {Dwt , Et}∞t=1,
where Dwt : Ht × [0, 1] × R → {0, 1} and Et : Ht × [0, 1] × R → {H,L} determine his
interaction decision and effort level as a function of the history in the previous stages, the
current public random variable, and the firm’s wage offer.
Let Dt := dft dwt . Following history ht and a posterior belief pt, the respective continu-
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ation payoffs to the firm and the worker from strategies (σP , σA) are given by
vt(pt|ht, (σP , σA)) := E
[
(1− δ)
∞∑
τ=t
δτ−t
(
Dt(yt − wt) + (1−Dt) v1− δ
)]
ut(pt|ht, (σP , σA)) := E
[
(1− δ)
∞∑
τ=t
δτ−t
(
Dt(wt − c1et=H) + (1−Dt)
u
1− δ
)]
where the expectation is taken over nonterminal histories that are continuations of ht given
the belief pt and the continuations of strategies (σP , σA).11
Following the literature, we define a relational contract as a Perfect Bayesian Equilib-
rium (PBE) with public randomization of the dynamic game with the restriction that beliefs
are updated recursively according to Bayes rule (1) after every period (henceforth referred
to as equilibrium). This means that the public beliefs are updated only through the realiza-
tion of the output given the worker’s action on and off path. The motivation behind this is
that in a PBE we can assign arbitrary beliefs off the equilibrium path. For example, if the
worker chose the high action when he was supposed to choose the low action, the posterior
belief can be arbitrary and unrelated to the output realization. This is obviously unsatis-
factory given the structure of our game. Ideally, we want to embed the notion that players
cannot signal what they do not know.12 Our restriction achieves this purpose.
Let E(p) denote the set of equilibrium payoffs of the game starting at prior belief p.
4 Equilibrium Characterization
4.1 Efficiency benchmark
The sole conflict in our environment is the separation between the entity exerting effort
(worker) and the entity collecting the output (firm). Therefore, our natural notion of ef-
ficiency is one where effort is contractible. Alternatively, we could view this as an ex-
perimentation problem wherein a planner, possessing the same information about match
quality as the firm and the worker, chooses effort to maximize the total surplus of the firm
and the worker. This is a multi-armed bandit problem with two correlated arms (H and L),
and one safe arm given by the outside options.
11Note that if the relationship is terminated at time t (Dt = 0), the game ends and no histories of length
greater than t occur in equilibrium. The players receive u1−δ and
v
1−δ at time t, which is equivalent to
receiving their outside options in each subsequent period.
12As Battigalli (1996) pointed out, this implies a notion of strategic independence.
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Given a value function f , let Tef denote the surplus from choosing an effort e ∈ {H,L}
today and drawing continuations from f according to the probabilty distribution induced
by e.
Tef(p) := (1− δ)(Re(p)− 1e=Hc) + δEe[f(p)]
where Ee[f(p)] = pie(p)f(φ+e (p)) + (1− pie(p))f(φ−e (p)) ∀e ∈ {H,L}
The optimal policy for this problem specifies an effort level or the outside options at
each belief p. Let G(p) denote the payoff associated with the optimal policy. The value
function G is the unique fixed point of the following operator T : B[0, 1]→ B[0, 1] where
B[0, 1] denotes the set of bounded real-valued functions on [0, 1]:
Tf(p) = max{THf(p), TLf(p), s}. (2)
Proposition 1 uses standard dynamic programming arguments to establish that G is
convex. Thus, the planner prefers more informative arms. SinceH offers more information
and more surplus than L, the planner never chooses the latter. Hence, the optimal policy
has a simple structure. There is a cutoff belief pFB above which the planner uses H and
below which the planner chooses the outside options.
Proposition 1. The efficient value function is given by the unique fixed point G of the
operator T . G is increasing and convex. There exists a unique belief pFB ∈ (0, 1) such that
the optimal policy is to choose H above pFB and the outside options below pFB.
All proofs are presented in the appendix.
4.2 Recursive Characterization
We proceed to analyse E(p), the set of equilibrium payoffs of the game starting with prior
p ∈ [0, 1]. Techniques from Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990) (APS) are easily adapted
to show that equilibria admit a recursive structure with the belief acting as a state variable.
Any equilibrium payoff (u, v) ∈ E(p) can be decomposed into an action profile for the cur-
rent period and continuation payoffs subject to incentive constraints. Continuation payoffs
must belong to E(p′), where p′ is the updated belief. For each (u, v) ∈ E(p), the payoffs
are decomposed in one of the following three ways.
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• (High effort) There exist continuation payoffs (u+, v+) ∈ E(φ+H(p)), (u−, v−) ∈
E(φ−H(p)) and a wage w such that,
v = (1− δ)(RH(p)− w) + δ[piH(p)v+ + (1− piH(p))v−]
u = (1− δ)(w − c) + δ[piH(p)u+ + (1− piH(p))u−]
v ≥ v, u ≥ u
δ
[
piH(p)u+ + (1− piH(p))u− − u
]
≥ (1− δ)c (3)
• (Low effort) There exist continuation payoffs (u+, v+) ∈ E(φ+L(p)), (u−, v−) ∈
E(φ−L(p)) and a wage w such that
v = (1− δ)(RL(p)− w) + δ[piL(p)v+ + (1− piL(p))v−]
u = (1− δ)w + δ[piL(p)u+ + (1− piL(p))u−]
v ≥ v u ≥ u
• (Termination) The firm does not interact or the worker rejects the offer.
v = v u = u
The above characterization relies on the fact that players act sequentially and publicly,
and that there is an equilibrium that gives both parties their outside options (see Lemma 2
in the appendix). This equilibrium is used to threaten deviators.
In light of this punishment, the incentive constraint for the firm is straightforward. Sup-
pose the firm deviates by offering w′. If w′ ≥ u, the worst continuation equilibrium for the
firm is one where the worker accepts and exerts L and the outside options are taken in the
following period. The resulting payoff for the firm is strictly less than v. If w′ < u, then
the worker quits giving the firm a payoff of v. Therefore, the firm’s incentives amount to a
participation constraint.
For the worker, an additional constraint (3) is that he needs to be compensated through
future continuation value if he is exerting H . If he deviates by choosing L, he still collects
the wage, saves on the cost c and is punished by receiving u tomorrow.
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4.3 Optimal Relational Contracts through Surplus Maximization
Notice that the contemporaneous wages can be used to redistribute surplus without affect-
ing incentives, as in Levin (2003). Hence, an optimal relational contract maximizes the
sum of the firm’s and the worker’s payoffs and is characterized by a surplus function S
defined below.
S(p) := max
(u,v)∈E(p)
{u+ v}
In a surplus-maximizing relational contract, it is without loss of generality to keep the
firm to its outside option and give the worker the entire future surplus over and above
the firm’s outside option by shifting the current wage in the firm’s favour. This offers
the strongest incentives for the worker without impacting the incentives of the firm. This
observation helps us characterize S as a fixed point of the operator T∗ defined in Lemma 1
below. T∗ resembles the operator T in (2) used to obtain the efficient surplus, but with the
addition of an incentive constraint (4) for using H .
Lemma 1. S is a fixed point of the operator T∗ : B[0, 1]→ B[0, 1] given by
T∗f(p) :=
 max{THf(p), TLf(p), s} if δ
(
EH [f(p)]− s
)
≥ (1− δ)c (4)
max{TLf(p), s} otherwise
and
S = lim
n→∞T
n
∗ G
where T n∗ G ≥ T n+1∗ G and the limit is taken pointwise.
The incentive constraint in T∗ implies that T∗ is not a contraction.13 Despite this, we
can still obtain S by iteratively applying T∗ on the efficient surplus function G. This result
exploits the algorithmic result of APS. The APS algorithm obtains the equilibrium payoff
set by an iterative application of a set-valued operator on a large enough payoff set. Since
our setting has a separate equilibrium payoff set for each belief, we adapt the algorithm to
operate on payoff correspondences. Then we exploit the fact that the equilibrium set at any
belief p can be characterized entirely by S(p). Thus, the APS algorithm can be reduced
13To see this, note that S is only one of many fixed points of T∗. Another fixed point is a function which
equals s for all beliefs in [0, 1).
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to operating on surplus functions. This characterization, stated in Lemma 1 below, will let
us establish a number of key properties of S, including a complete characterization of the
optimal relational contract.
5 Results
5.1 (In)efficiency of relational contracts
We say that relational contracts are inefficient if the optimal relational contract cannot
achieve the efficient surplus at some belief i.e. S(p) < G(p) for some p ∈ [0, 1]. In the
absence of any private information, the only tension is the separation between the entity
incuring the cost of effort (worker) and the entity collecting the output (firm). In an envi-
ronment with known match quality, MacLeod and Malcomson (1989) showed that when
the players are sufficiently patient, relational contracts are efficient. The uncertainty about
match quality, even though symmetric, may overturn this result. Proposition 2 provides a
necessary and sufficient condition for inefficiency.
Proposition 2. Relational contracts are inefficient if and only if RH(pFB) > s.
We proceed to illustrate the argument. Since every belief admits an equilibrium where
the parties receive their outside options, the efficient solution can be replicated in a rela-
tional contract at every belief p < pFB.Hence, to establish efficiency, it suffices to show that
every belief p ≥ pFB admits an equilibrium where the worker chooses H . This amounts to
showing that H can be incentivized at pFB since relational contracts generate more surplus
at higher beliefs. Since G(pFB) = s, we have
(1− δ)
(
RH(pFB)− c
)
+ δEH [G(p)] = s.
This means that the cost of H is exactly compensated by the sum of two terms: the con-
temporaneous output and continuation surplus in excess of the sum of the outside options:
(1− δ) c︸ ︷︷ ︸
Today’s cost
= (1− δ)(RH(pFB)− s)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Today’s excess surplus
+ δ(EH [G(p)]− s)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Tomorrow’s excess surplus
.
In equilibrium, the firm cannot commit to rewarding the worker with the output in
the current period. This creates a holdup problem when today’s excess surplus must be
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used to compensate the worker for his effort in the efficient solution. The worker can be
incentivized to choose H only when tomorrow’s excess surplus exceeds today’s cost, as
evidenced by (4). If RH(pFB) > s, tomorrow’s excess surplus must be less than today’s
cost, i.e., the incentive constraint (4) at pFB fails even if the continuation surplus in relational
contracts S equals the efficient surplus G. Since S ≤ G, relational contracts are inefficient.
Conversely, if RH(pFB) ≤ s, then the incentive constraint at pFB is satisfied assuming
that the continuation surplus is given by G. A fixed point argument using Lemma 1 then
establishes that relational contracts are efficient.14
Since the source of inefficiency is a holdup problem on today’s excess surplus, one
might think that the introduction of output-contingent spot contracts would restore it. How-
ever, as we show in Section 7, as long as the worker is protected by limited liability, the
inefficiency persists. Thus, the inefficiency is not a direct consequence of unknown match
quality but rather its subtle interaction with incomplete contracts.
While Proposition 2 places a condition on the cutoff belief in the efficient outcome
which is an endogenous object, Corollary 1 below gives a sufficient condition for ineffi-
ciency, based only on the primitives of the model.
Corollary 1. If RH(0) ≥ s, then relational contracts are inefficient.
Moreover, if the condition above fails, i.e. RH(0) < s, then, relational contracts are
efficient for a sufficiently high δ. When δ is fixed, it is also possible to generate sets of
parameters with positive measures for which relational contracts are efficient or inefficient.
5.2 Optimal relational contracts
We now give a characterization of the optimal relational contracts.
Proposition 3. An optimal relational contract is described by two cutoff beliefs: p and p¯
such that p¯ ≥ p ≥ pFB. At any belief p
• The firm and the worker interact if and only if p ≥ p.
• The worker exerts L if p ∈ [p, p¯).
• The worker exerts H if p ≥ p¯.
14The nature of the holdup problem is not tied to the specific information structure we consider. The
argument generalises to a setting with continuous output under sufficient regularity.
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Figure 4: Plot of G and S
The structure of optimal relational contracts can be interpreted as follows. When the
players are sufficiently pessimistic about the match quality, the (expected) value of the
relationship is low and learning has a high opportunity cost, so it is optimal to fire the
worker. When the players are highly optimistic, the future value of the relationship is
sufficient to incentivize the worker to exert H . At intermediate beliefs there is not enough
surplus to provide incentives, but the firm would like to retain the worker, as it is reasonably
likely that the match quality is good. This is accomplished by the worker choosing Lwhich
is cheaper to incentivize and also offers some learning.
The structure of the optimal relational contracts resembles PIPs mentioned in the in-
troduction. Typically, a worker not meeting the performance standards is placed on a PIP
where he is monitored closely. In the event that his performance improves, the worker
is moved out of a PIP; otherwise, he is fired. In our model, this corresponds to a belief
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that dips below p¯ and climbs back above it. These dynamics are different from the ideas of
“starting small” (Ghosh and Ray, 1996; Watson, 1999, 2002; Halac, 2014). In these models,
parties build up the value of their relationship monotonically as long as it is not terminated.
In our model, beliefs do not evolve monotonically so the value of the relationship may not
improve with time. The parties realise that a drop in beliefs may happen even if the match
quality is good, so the worker is given a chance to improve his performance, instead of
being fired immediately. Hence, our model explains why a worker in good standing can be
placed on a PIP, complete it successfully and continue his career with the firm.
While Proposition 3 does not guarantee that L is used in an optimal relational contract,
Proposition 4 below gives a condition on the parameters of the model, under which this is
the case. This condition implies the sufficient condition for inefficiency in Corollary 1.
Proposition 4. If RL(0)− s+ δpiL(0)(RH(0)− s) ≥ 0 then p < p¯ in Proposition 3.
We proceed to give an overview of the proof of Proposition 3. A starting intuition is that
H should be preferable to L at any belief, so that the worker exerts L only if the incentive
constraint for H cannot be satisfied. Incentive provision being easier at higher beliefs
(as there is more future surplus to promise the worker), the three-region structure should
result. However, this intuition is precluded by the nonconvexity of S, the surplus function
in the optimal relational contract (Figure 4).15,16 Hence, more informative actions are not
necessarily preferable. Recall that L is never used in the efficient benchmark because
more information is better, and H dominates L on both the informativeness and payoff
dimensions. In a relational contract, L may be preferred to H at some beliefs where the
gains from the inferior information in L outweigh the payoff losses. Therefore, we cannot
dismiss the possibility of multiple switches between L and H as the beliefs improve.
The key to overcoming this obstacle lies in the APS algorithm as seen in Lemma 1. As
S can be obtained through iterative application of T∗ to the efficient surplus function G, S
inherits the properties ofG that are preserved under T∗. While T∗ does not preserve convex-
ity (or even continuity), it preserves the weaker property that, barring incentive constraints,
H is preferred to L.
15The parameters used for the plot are γH = 0.7, βH = 0.45, γL = 0.35, βL = 0.226, c = 0.22, δ = 0.85,
u = 0.15, v = 0.2.
16S exhibits a jump at p¯ where the optimal effort switches from L to H . The reason is that the surplus
from H exceeds the surplus from L at any belief, which will be shown as part of the proof of Proposition 3.
Even though H would create more surplus than L at beliefs lower than p¯, the incentive constraint precludes
its use, resulting in the jump. Consequently, there are jumps at beliefs, whose posteriors reach p¯, or can be
reached from p¯.
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Definition 1. A function f : [0, 1]→ R exhibits a monotone policy if THf ≥ TLf .
If an increasing function f exhibits a monotone policy, then the optimal policy associ-
ated with f will exhibit the three-region structure of Proposition 3. Therefore, the proof
boils down to showing that if an increasing function f exhibits a monotone policy, then T∗f
is also an increasing function that exhibits a monotone policy. The details of this argument
are provided in the appendix.
Proposition 3 resembles the characterization in the infinitely repeated stochastic part-
nership game studied by McAdams (2011). Therein, the state, which evolves exogenously,
captures the temptation to cheat. Though outwardly different, these two models have a
similar intuition behind obtaining the three-region characterization: providing incentives
is difficult when future prospects of the relationship look grim. In such situations, parties
interact but indulge in inefficient activities, hoping that the relationship could drift towards
an optimistic regime. In our model, the state variable that affects the incentives is the belief
about the match quality which evolves endogenously.
6 Asymptotic Behavior
In this section we explore the limit of our baseline model as the parties become arbitrarily
patient. There are two typical approaches. Folk theorems analyze the limit as δ → 1,
ceteris paribus. It is also possible to consider a frequent action limit in which the length
of each period is reduced to 0 without changing patience per unit of time. In a seminal
paper, Abreu, Milgrom, and Pearce (1991) (AMP) showed that these two approaches can
produce radically different results in games of imperfect monitoring. In repeated games of
perfect monitoring the two approaches are equivalent when information is complete. This
equivalence breaks down in our richer setting due to incomplete information about match
quality. For example, if information accumulates with calendar time, shortening the period
length degrades the quality of information. Therefore, the presence of learning about match
quality is a unique opportunity to explore differences between these two approaches in a
game of perfect monitoring.
We do this by studying a sequence of (discrete time) instances of our model with δ
converging to 1 along the sequence. As δ grows, the quality of information per period
may (but need not) degrade. The main result of this section, Theorem 1, shows that the
speed at which information degrades relative to the speed at which impatience vanishes
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is crucial for the limit behavior of our model. If information degrades at a slower rate, a
folk theorem obtains and relational contracts are efficient in the sense that the sup norm of
G−S converges to 0 as δ → 1. Wiseman (2005) obtains a similar result when information
is unchanged along the sequence by proving a folk theorem in general repeated games with
learning.17,18 Our result can be seen as a mild extension of this folk theorem to a case in
which information can degrade, but it does so more slowly than the rate at which players
become patient.
On the other hand, if information degrades at a rate equal to or higher than the rate
of decay of impatience, relational contracts can be inefficient in the limit – the holdup
problem of Proposition 2 persists even with patient players. This result stands in contrast
to the folk theorem of Peski and Wiseman (2015) where the probability of a state change
vanishes with period length. In our setting it is possible that the probability of a substantial
change in state (beliefs) vanishes with period length, yet the belief always changes and a
folk theorem may or may not hold.
The case where information and impatience degrade at the same rate is reminiscent of
AMP. They study a two player prisoner’s dilemma with imperfect monitoring. A key take-
away in the frequent action limit is that the sustainability of cooperation crucially depends
on the nature of information. In their “good news” environment, signals arrive according
to a Poisson distribution, and their rate is higher when players cooperate than when they
defect. In the “bad news” environment, the rate of Poisson signals is higher when the play-
ers defect than when they cooperate. The bad news environment facilitates full cooperation
when the players are sufficiently patient, while the good news environment offers no hope
thereof. The source of this difference is imperfect monitoring, where information is used
to statistically infer the actions played in the past. In our environment – learning with
perfect monitoring – actions are public, and the information is only used to learn about
future prospects. Therefore, regardless of the environment (good news or bad news), the
holdup problem of Proposition 2 gives rise to inefficiencies when information degrades at
the same rate as patience. Qualitatively there is no distinction between the two environ-
ments, in contrast to AMP. We illustrate this point with a simple example at the end of this
17Technically, the folk theorem of Wiseman (2005) does not apply to our setting because the set of indi-
vidually rational payoffs in the game where match quality is known to be bad has an empty interior.
18For further work on folk theorems with learning see Fudenberg and Yamamoto (2010), Fudenberg and
Yamamoto (2011), Wiseman (2012), and Yamamoto (2017). Well-known folk theorems for stochastic games
(e.g. Ho¨rner et al. (2011)) do not apply to our setting because the space of beliefs is not an irreducible state
space due to the option of quitting.
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section.
Formally, we consider a sequence of models (Mk)∞k=1 with parameters indexed by k
and cutoffs pFBk , pk, p¯k as in Proposition 1 and Proposition 3, such that:
1. δk → 1 as k →∞
2. None of ck, RkH , R
k
L, uk, vk vary with k.
3. The limits pFB∗ = limk→∞ pFBk and p¯∗ = limk→∞ p¯k exist, as well as the (possibly
infinite) limits of γ
k
H
βkH
, 1−γ
k
H
1−βkH
, and γ
k
H−βkH
1−δk as k →∞.
The second assumption is merely a normalization of per-period payoffs.19 Henceforth,
payoffs will not be indexed by k, in order to economize on notation. The last assumption
involves no loss of generality, as it amounts to considering a subsequence.
In addition, we assume that either the limiting posterior belief following H and success
exceeds any interior prior or the limiting posterior belief following H and failure is below
any interior prior. This is formally stated in Assumption 4 below.
Assumption 4. At least one of the following holds:
(a) limk γ
k
H
βkH
∈ (1,∞]
(b) limk 1−γ
k
H
1−βkH
∈ [0, 1).
We measure the informativeness of H via the variance of the posterior belief:
VarkH(p) = pikH(p)
(
φ+H,k(p)− p
)2
+ (1− pikH(p))
(
φ−H,k(p)− p
)2
.
The limit of the ratio Var
k
H(p)
1−δk measures the rate of decay of information per period relative to
the rate at which impatience vanishes, when the prior belief is p. In the proof of Theorem 1
we show that this limiting ratio exists and is either finite for all p ∈ (0, 1) or infinite for all
p ∈ (0, 1). The relative rate of information decay plays a key role in the characterization of
the limiting outcome presented below.
Theorem 1. The following are equivalent:
(i) limk→∞ Var
k
H(p)
1−δk is finite for all p ∈ (0, 1)
19It is possible to normalize payoffs per unit of time to the same effect.
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(ii) pFB∗ > 0.
(iii) p¯∗ > 0.
In addition, if RH(pFB∗ ) > s then (i)-(iii) are also equivalent to
(iv) p¯∗ > pFB∗ .
Notice that RH(pFB∗ ) > s is an analogue of the condition in Proposition 2, which char-
acterizes the holdup problem in the baseline model.
The centerpiece of Theorem 1 is the class of models where the informativeness of H
per period decays at the same rate as the players’ discounting. These models approximate a
natural environment in which information about match quality arrives in continuous time,
but the players act at discrete points in time, with actions becoming arbitrarily frequent.
Under this interpretation, information is proportional to the length of the period and Theo-
rem 1 shows that the tensions of the baseline model persist in the limit: First, the learning
problem is nontrivial, since the efficient solution exhibits an interior cutoff that separates
outside options and experimentation through H . Second, there is an incentive problem
associated with the use of H in relational contracts. The holdup problem from Proposi-
tion 2 which characterizes inefficiency in the baseline model also characterizes inefficiency
in the limit. Two natural examples, outlined at the end of this section, are models in which
success or failure are realized with probability proportional to the length of the period.
In addition to characterizing the limiting outcome of these frequent action models, The-
orem 1 shows that they are at the boundary of two qualitatively different environments.
When information decays faster than the rate of impatience, the holdup problem high-
lighted in Proposition 2—and thereby the resulting inefficiency—persists in the limit. On
the other hand, when information decays at a comparatively slower rate, or does not vanish
at all, we obtain a folk theorem: At any positive belief, the efficient solution and the opti-
mal relational contract involve experimentation through H when the discount factor is high
enough. The reason is that the opportunity cost of learning vanishes relative to its benefit.
In our baseline model, one consequence of inefficiency is that the use of Lmay increase
the surplus of an optimal relational contract. However, this property is not preserved in
the limit. Let S denote the pointwise limit of (Sk), taking a subsequence, if necessary.20
Proposition 5 below states that L does not create any surplus in the limit.
Proposition 5. Let pˆ = inf{p|S(p) > s}. Then p¯∗ ≤ pˆ.
20The limit exists by Helly’s selection theorem and Lemma 6.
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6.1 Example: Good and bad news Poisson models
We illustrate the results of this section with an example of a good news Poisson model in
which the players become patient at the same rate as the rate of information decay. Consider
a sequence ∆k of period lengths converging to 0. The discount factor is δk = e−∆k . The
probabilities of success with known match quality in modelMk are given by
γkH = γH∆k γkL = γL∆k
βkH = βH∆k βkL = βL∆k.
This approximates a Poisson arrival of success as ∆k → 0. Such an information structure is
interpreted as a “good news” model because the rare signal makes players more optimistic
about their match quality causing their belief to jump upwards.21
The values of success and failure are yhk = 1∆k and y
l
k = 0 respectively, so the revenue
from effort e is Re(p) = pγe + (1− p)βe..
The proof of Theorem 1 shows that the variance of the posterior is proportional to
γkH − βkH which is of the order of ∆. Hence, limk→∞ Var
k
H(p)
1−δk is finite for all p ∈ (0, 1).
Theorem 1, therefore, implies that the learning problem in the efficient solution is non-
trivial. In addition, the inefficiency of relational contracts can persist in the limit, when-
ever the holdup problem of Proposition 2 arises. A sufficient condition for inefficiency is
RH(0) > c, similarly to Corollary 1.
Alternatively, we can consider a bad news model where the probability of failure is
proportional to ∆. To be more precise, the probabilities of failure with known match quality
in modelMk are given by
1− γkH = γH∆k 1− γkL = γL∆k
1− βkH = βH∆k 1− βkL = βL∆k.
The value of a success and failure are yhk = 0, ylk = − 1∆ respectively.
Unlike the good news model, here the “news” is a failure and, upon its arrival the pos-
terior jumps discretely downward. Also, in contrast to the imperfect monitoring setting of
AMP—both the models exhibit inefficiencies due to a holdup problem even asymptotically.
Lastly, a very special case of the good news model is the “fully revealing good news”
21In the experimentation literature “good news” and “bad news” is often conclusive, i.e. one signal estab-
lishes the match quality. This is a special case of our model when βH = βL = 0.
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model where βH = βL = 0. Here, any success conclusively establishes that the match qual-
ity is good. This model parallels Ho¨rner and Samuelson (2013) and similar inefficiencies
arise in this environment as in theirs.
7 Extensions
Our model can be extended in various directions. We briefly discuss some natural directions
in which our results generalize.
7.1 Spot contracts contingent on output
As we saw in Section 5.1, the source of inefficiency is a holdup problem arising from the
separation between the firm that collects the output and the worker, who exerts effort. A
natural question is whether this inefficiency would disappear if the parties could write one
period contracts contingent on output. As we show below, limited liability plays a key role
in the answer. If the worker is protected by limited liability, output contingent contracts
cannot achieve efficiency unless it was already achievable with constant wages. But, when
the worker is not protected by limited liability, relational contracts achieve efficiency by
spreading the wages for success and failure to induce high effort.
Proposition 6. Suppose the firm can commit to one-period output-contingent contracts.
Then efficiency can be achieved if the worker is not protected by limited liability. If the
minimum wage the firm must offer the worker for any level of output is u, then relational
contracts are inefficient iff RH(pFB) > s.
7.2 Combination of verifiable and non-verifiable actions
In most organizations, there are some contractible aspects of a worker’s behavior. Hence,
the lack of contractibility in our model may seem extreme. However, it is also common that
some aspects of the worker’s behavior are not verifiable in court. For example, a teaching
assistant’s wage can be contingent on the number of sections she teaches but not on how
well she answers questions. As we show here, the holdup problem from the baseline model
remains as long as there is some non-contractibility of the worker’s actions. Moreover, in
any optimal relational contract, the parties can find the use of dominated actions beneficial
for reasons similar to Proposition 3.
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We model a mix of contractible and non-contractible actions by considering two-dimensional
effort e ∈ {L,H}×{L,H}. We assume that the first component of e is verifiable in court,
while the second is not. The cost of effort is separable in the two components, and H is
more costly than L on each of them. Effort is ranked informationally as well as in payoff
as follows:
(H,H)  (H,L)  (L,H)  (L,L)
Naturally, the efficient outcome involves using (H,H) above a certain cutoff belief
and taking the outside option below. The argument for inefficiency in Proposition 2 is
virtually unchanged, as the same holdup problem arises on the non-contractible dimension.
Moreover, an analogous result to our Proposition 4 holds, showing that an optimal relational
contract would involve using L on the non-contractible dimension.
7.3 Continuous effort
So far we have analyzed a setting with only two efforts, one of which is both more informa-
tive and more profitable. A natural question is whether a continuous choice of effort would
produce similar inefficiencies. In this section we enrich the model by making the choice of
effort continuous. Also, a more informative effort may not necessarily be more profitable.
As mentioned previously, such correlated bandit problems are very difficult to analyze in
discrete time once the information and payoffs ranking do not coincide. However, we show
that our central findings are true in this model as well: (i) relational contracts can be ineffi-
cient and (ii) efforts that are worse for both information and payoff are used in an optimal
relational contract.
To this end, consider a modification of the baseline model where effort lies in [0, 1].
Let there be two strictly increasing, concave functions γ and β defining the probability of
success conditional on the choice of effort (e) and match quality (θ) as follows:
γ(e) = Prob(yh|θ = G, effort = e)
β(e) = Prob(yh|θ = B, effort = e).
Let c(e) be the cost of effort e where c is strictly increasing and convex. The myopic profit
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from effort e at prior p is given by
h(p, e) := p[γ(e)yh + (1− γ(e))yl] + (1− p)[β(e)yh + (1− β(e))yl]− c(e).
We assume that γ, β, and c are differentiable and satisfy the following assumption.
Assumption 5. 1. γ(e)
β(e) is increasing in e, and γ
′(e) > β′(e)
2. c(0) = c′(0) = 0.
3. γ′(1) < c′(1)
The myopically efficient action at belief p is denoted by eˆ(p) given by,
∂h(p, eˆ(p))
∂e
= [pγ′(eˆ(p)) + (1− p)β′(eˆ(p))][yh − yl]− c′(eˆ(p)) = 0.
Assumption 5 implies that eˆ is increasing and 0 < e := eˆ(0) < eˆ(1) =: e¯ < 1. That
is, conditional on the match quality being good (bad), the efficient action is e¯ (e) which is
strictly less than 1 (larger than 0).
The measure of informativeness for an effort e is the fraction γ(e)
β(e) , which is increasing
due to Assumption 5. Hence, higher effort levels are more informative, but not necessarily
more profitable.
As in the baseline model, the optimal policy for the efficient outcome is characterized
by a cutoff pFB, below which the outside options are taken. Also, the value function is
convex. Therefore, efforts dominated in both payoff and informational content are not
used. In particular, efforts lower than e are never used.
The holdup problem in the baseline model arises because the action chosen at the effi-
cient cutoff is costly to the worker. Here too, since the lowest effort chosen is e, the choice
of effort at pFB will involve a cost to be borne by the worker. Therefore, the qualitative
nature of the holdup problem is identical to the case of two efforts resulting in efficiency
not being achievable in any relational contract. Moreover, a condition analogous to our
Proposition 4 shows that efforts that are worse for both information and payoff will be used
in the optimal relational contract.
While we have highlighted the form of inefficiency resulting in the use of efforts that
are inferior for information as well as payoff, in this richer model, the optimal relational
contract may involve the worker choosing an inefficiently higher effort. This can be seen
numerically as shown in Figure 5. Notice that, for a range of beliefs in the middle, the
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pEffort
Optimal Relational Contract
Efficient Solution
Figure 5: Plot of effort in the planner’s and agency problem.
Parameters: γ(e) = 0.95e, β(e) = 27
√
e, c(e) = 0.9e2 − 0.009, e ∈ [0.1, 1].
worker chooses an effort that is higher than the efficient benchmark. Also, as we can see,
the optimal effort is non-monotonic in both the efficient benchmark and the optimal rela-
tional contract. This non-monotonicity arises because the informational and payoff rank-
ings do not coincide. This is precisely why correlated bandits are difficult to analytically
understand in such problems.
7.4 Exogenous Learning
The three-region structure obtained in Proposition 3 suggests that higher effort is used
at higher beliefs when efforts have the same informational and profitability rankings. Al-
though this property does not generalize to a setting with more than two effort levels, mono-
tonic effort can be recovered in a simpler model where each effort is equally informative.22
To formalize this model, suppose the set of effort levels is [0, 1] and the probabilities of
success given good and bad match quality are γ and β, respectively, regardless of the effort.
Let g : [0, 1]→ R+ and c : [0, 1]→ R+ be strictly increasing, C2 functions describing the
22McAdams (2011) also considers exogenous learning with relational contracts set in a partnership game
with two effort levels and and shows a similar monotonicity of effort.
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revenue from success and the cost of effort, respectively. We assume g is concave and c is
convex with c(0) = 0. The revenue from failure is 0, regardless of the effort. Hence, the
myopic profit of effort e at a prior p, is given by
h(p, e) = [pγ + (1− p)β]︸ ︷︷ ︸
pi(p)
g(e)− c(e).
In particular, if we assume that pi(p)g′(1)−c′(1) > 0 for all p, then the efficient solution
would naturally involve the outside options below a cutoff pFB and effort e = 1 above it.
Now consider the surplus from effort e at prior p in a relational contract:
(1− δ)h(p, e) + δEeS(p).
Since all efforts are equally informative, they all bring the same expected continuation
surplus Ee[S(p)]. Hence, higher effort is more profitable. Its use is precluded only by the
incentive constraint:
δ[EeS(p)− s] ≥ (1− δ)c(e).
Since the cost of effort is increasing, the set of incentive compatible effort levels at prior
p is an interval [0, e¯(p)] where e¯ is increasing. The optimal relational contract involves
the outside options below a threshold belief p and effort e¯(p) at any higher belief. Hence,
the effort is smoothly increasing in the belief. As in the continuous effort model in the
previous section, our main results regarding inefficiency and the use of dominated efforts
in equilibrium can be shown to hold.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we studied a dynamic firm-worker relationship with symmetric uncertainty
about match quality and limits to contractibility. There are two main takeaways. First,
despite the absence of private information, uncertainty about the match quality can pre-
clude efficiency. Second, the presence of actions that produce both worse information and
worse payoffs offer a partial remedy, as they may be cheaper to incentivize. The ineffi-
ciency is robust to various extensions of the model, and persists in a frequent action limit.
Moreover, separating the effects of higher patience and shorter period length reveals that
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limiting efficiency depends on the relationship between the rates of decay of information
and impatience.
In our view, the two key features in our environment – unknown match quality and
incompleteness of contracts – are pervasive. Therefore, our model could serve as a building
block toward studying various other economically important scenarios, such as obtaining
the nature of relational contracts when there is partial contractibility in the form of spot
contracts on output or even long run contracts on output. Another natural direction is
to endogenize the outside option by embedding our model in a labor market with search
frictions. Also, as mentioned in Section 3.2, our model is formally equivalent to a setting
where the firm assigns jobs to the worker. This interpretation relates us to Pastorino (2018)
who finds, in a setting with worker not being strategic, that learning about ability accounts
for one quarter of cumulative wage growth of a worker. We believe that our framework can
be used to understand the effect of learning on wages when the worker is strategic.
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9 Appendix
Proofs from Section 4.1
Proof of Proposition 1. G is the unique solution of the Bellman equation f = Tf . Stan-
dard contraction mapping arguments establish that G is increasing. To establish the con-
vexity of G, let f ∈ B[0, 1] be convex. It suffices to show that THf and TLf are convex,
since a maximum of convex functions is convex. To this end, let p1, p2 ∈ [0, 1], λ ∈ [0, 1]
and p˜ = λp1 + (1− λ)p2 and notice that
f(pi+H(p˜)) = f
(
λpiH(p1)
piH(p˜)
γHp1
piH(p1)
+ (1− λ)piH(p2)
piH(p˜)
γHp2
piH(p2)
)
≤ λpiH(p1)
piH(p˜)
f
(
pi+H(p1)
)
+ (1− λ)piH(p2)
piH(p˜)
f
(
pi+H(p2)
)
and f(pi−H(p˜)) ≤
λ(1− piH(p1))
1− piH(p˜) f
(
pi−H(p1)
)
+ (1− λ)(1− piH(p2))1− piH(p˜) f
(
pi−H(p2)
)
.
It follows that
THf(p˜) = (1− δ)(RH(p˜)− c) + δ
(
piH(p˜)f(pi+H(p˜)) + (1− piH(p˜))f(pi−H(p˜))
)
≤ (1− δ)(RH(p˜)− c) + δ
(
λpiH(p1)f(pi+H(p1)) + (1− λ)piH(p2)f(pi+H(p2))
)
+ δ
(
λ(1− piH(p1))f(pi−H(p1)) + (1− λ)(1− piH(p2))f(pi−H(p2))
)
= λ
(
(1− δ)(RH(p1)− c) + δEH [f(p1)]
)
+ (1− λ)
(
(1− δ)(RH(p2)− c) + δEH [f(p2)]
)
= λTHf(p1) + (1− λ)THf(p2)
as required. The argument for the convexity of TLf is analogous.
The convexity and monotonicity of G imply that THG > TLG, so L is never used in
the optimal policy. By Assumption 1, RH(1) > s > RH(0), so G(1) = γH − c and
G(0) = s > THG(0). By continuity of G, there exists a maximal belief pFB ∈ (0, 1) such
that G(pFB) = s. Since THG is strictly increasing, G(p) > s for all p > pFB. Hence, the
optimal policy is to take the outside options at beliefs p ≤ pFB and to choose H at higher
beliefs. Clearly, pFB is unique.
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Proofs from Section 4.2
Here, we adapt the results of APS to our setting. We begin by obtaining the worst equilib-
rium payoffs.
Lemma 2. (u, v) ∈ E(p) for all p.
Proof. Let p ∈ [0, 1]. Consider the following strategies:
• The firm never interacts with the worker.
• The worker accepts wage offer w if and only if w ≥ u and always chooses L.
As the worker is never rewarded for choosing H , he chooses L whenever he accepts the
wage offer. Since he expects to receive his outside option in the future he only accepts wage
offers above u. Given that the worker chooses L, the firm does not get enough expected
output to justify paying the worker u since RL(p) ≤ RL(1) < s. Hence, the strategies
constitute a PBE with payoffs (u, v) at belief p.
Let C0 denote the set of bounded payoff correspondences W : [0, 1] ⇒ R2. Let C
denote the set of compact-valued, upper hemicontinuous correspondences W ∈ C0 such
that (u, v) ∈ W (p) for all p.
We say payoffs (u, v) are enforceable with respect to W ∈ C0 at belief p ∈ [0, 1] if they
can be decomposed by an action profile in the initial period and continuation payoffs as
described in the recursive formulation in Section 4.2 except that the continuation payoffs
are drawn from W instead of E .
Definition 2. Let BW (p) be the convex hull of the set of payoffs (u, v) which are enforce-
able with respect to W ∈ C at belief p.
It is straightforward to check that BW ∈ C whenever W ∈ C.
Definition 3. A correspondence W ∈ C0 is self-generating if W (p) ⊆ BW (p) for all p.
Proposition 7 (Self-generation). If W ∈ C0 is self-generating, then BW (p) ⊆ E(p) for all
p.
Proof. Let p ∈ [0, 1] and (u, v) ∈ BW (p). If (u, v) = (u, v) then Lemma 2 implies
(u, v) ∈ E(p). Otherwise, (u, v) is enforced by effort e, wage w and continuation payoffs
(u+, v+) ∈ BW (φ+e (p)) and (u−, v−) ∈ BW (φ−e (p)) sinceW is self-generating. Construct
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inductively equilibrium strategies as follows: in the initial period, the firm offers wage w,
the worker accepts and exerts effort e. Continuation strategies after any deviations follow
the PBE in Lemma 2 with payoffs (u, v). Continuation strategies on the equilibrium path
are constructed by decomposing the continuation payoffs inductively in the same manner.
An application of the one-shot deviation principle shows that the strategies form an equi-
librium. Boundedness of W guarantees that the resulting equilibrium payoffs equal (u, v),
as required.
Proposition 8 (Factorization). BE(p) = E(p) for all p.
Proof. Since equilibrium payoffs are bounded by the outside options and the production
technology, E ∈ C0. Let p ∈ [0, 1], (u, v) ∈ E(p). By Proposition 7 it suffices to show
that (u, v) ∈ BE(p). If (u, v) = (u, v), this is trivial. Otherwise, consider without loss
of generality a PBE σ at belief p with payoffs (u, v) without public randomization in the
initial period. The payoffs (u, v) are enforceable with respect to W at p, since they can
be decomposed by the first-period effort and wage, and the on-path continuation payoffs
following success and failure in σ. To see this, note that (u, v) ≥ (u, v) since the players
are free to exercise their outside options. Moreover, the incentive constraint for H given
by (3) holds, since otherwise the agent can profitably deviate from σ in the first period by
exerting L and taking his outside option in the next period. Hence, (u, v) ∈ BE(p), as
required.
Proposition 9 (APS algorithm). Let W0 ∈ C satisfy W0(p) ⊇ BW0(p) and W0(p) ⊇ E(p)
for all p. Inductively define Wn = BWn−1 for all n ∈ N. Let W ∗(p) = ∩n∈NWn(p) for all
p. Then W ∗(p) = E(p) for all p.
Proof. Observe that B is monotonic: any correspondences U,U ′ ∈ C0 with U(p) ⊆ U ′(p)
for all p satisfy BU(p) ⊆ BU ′(p) for all p. Hence Wn−1(p) ⊇ Wn(p) for all n, p and
consequently, W ∗(p) ⊇ E(p). To show the converse inclusion it suffices to show W ∗ is
self-generating. To this end, let p ∈ [0, 1] and (u, v) ∈ W ∗(p). Then (u, v) ∈ BWn(p) for
all n. We want to show (u, v) ∈ BW ∗(p). It is sufficient to consider (u, v) 6= (u, v).
Then, there exists an effort level e such that (u, v) ∈ BWn(p) for infinitely many n.
Along this subsequence, let wn denote the wage offered, (u+n , v+n ) and (u−n , v−n ) be the
continuation payoffs following success and failure respectively. Without loss of gener-
ality these sequences converge to w, (u+, v+) and (u−, v−) respectively. Compactness
of Wn(φ+e (p)) and Wn(φ−e (p)) and monotonicity in n imply (u+, v+) ∈ W ∗(φ+e (p)) and
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(u−, v−) ∈ W ∗(φ−e (p)). Hence, (u, v) is enforceable with respect toW ∗ at belief p through
wage w and continuation payoffs (u+, v+) and (u−, v−), that is (u, v) ∈ BW ∗(p).
Corollary 2. E is compact-valued and upper hemicontinuous.
Proof. This follows from the fact that eachWn in the statement of Proposition 9 is compact-
valued and upper hemicontinuous.
Proofs from Section 4.3
It will be useful to operate on payoff correspondences that, like the equilibrium correspon-
dence, are fully described by the maximum sum of payoffs that can be achieved at every
belief.
Definition 4. Let D be the set of all correspondences W ∈ C such that
W (p) = {(u, v)|(u, v) ≥ (u, v), u+ v ≤ SW (p)} for all p
for some SW : [0, 1]→ [s, γH − c].
Lemma 3. If W ∈ D, then BW ∈ D.
Proof. Let
SBW (p) = max
(u,v)∈BW (p)
u+ v for all p.
Let p ∈ [0, 1]. Notice that SBW (p) ≥ s by definition of the operatorB. Moreover,RH(1)−c
is an upper bound on the sum of payoffs in a single period so SBW (p) ∈ [s, RH(1)− c]. It
only remains to show that if (u, v) ≥ (u, v) and u + v = SBW then (u, v) ∈ BW (p) (the
rest follows from taking convex combinations of (u, v) and efficient payoffs in BW (p)).
The statement clearly holds if SBW (p) = s so suppose SBW (p) > s and consider any
such (u, v). There exists a payoff (u′, v′) ∈ BW (p) with u′+ v′ = SBW (p) which does not
involve public randomization, since BW (p) is a compact, convex subset of [u,∞)×[v,∞).
The payoff (u, v) can be supported by the same effort and continuation payoffs as (u′, v′)
through an adjustment of the wage.
Lemma 4 states that in any optimal relational contract it is without loss of generality
to give the worker the highest equilibrium continuation payoff. This can only improve the
34
incentives for the worker to exert H , and the wage can be used to redistribute the surplus
without violating incentives for the firm. The same result holds when L is enforced but is
not needed.
Lemma 4. Let W ∈ D, p ∈ [0, 1]. Consider a payoff (u, v) such that
u+ v = max{u′ + v′|(u′, v′) ∈ BW (p) is enforced by H}.
Then (u, v) can be enforced by effort H and continuation payoffs uˆ+ = SW (φ+H(p)) − v
and uˆ− = SW (φ−H(p))− v for the worker.
Proof. By definition, (u, v) is enforced by some wagew and continuation payoffs (ui, vi) ∈
W (φiH(p)) for i ∈ {+,−}. Let vˆi = v for all i. Since W ∈ D we have (uˆi, vˆi) ∈
W (φiH(p)) for all i. Consider a wage
wˆ = w − δ1− δ [piH(p)(v
+ − v) + (1− piH(p))(v− − v)].
We want to show that (u, v) is also enforced by H , wage wˆ and continuation payoffs
(uˆ+, vˆ+) and (uˆ−, vˆ−) following success and failure respectively.
Efficiency of (u, v) implies that ui + vi = S(φiH(p)) for all i so the promise keeping
constraints readily hold:
v = (1− δ)[RH(p)− wˆ] + δ[piH(p)vˆ+ + (1− piH(p))vˆ−]
u = (1− δ)[wˆ − c] + δ[piH(p)uˆ+ + (1− piH(p))uˆ−].
It remains to check the incentive constraints. Clearly, (u, v) ≥ (u, v) so we only need to
check the incentive constraint for effort. For any i we have
SW (φiH(p)) = ui + vi = uˆi + v
so vi ≥ v implies uˆi ≥ ui. Since the incentive constraint holds in the original decomposi-
tion with continuation payoffs u+ and u− we have
piH(p)uˆ+ + (1− piH(p))uˆ− − u
≥piH(p)u+ + (1− piH(p))u− − u ≥ 1− δ
δ
c
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which completes the proof.
The following result follows directly from Lemma 3 and Proposition 9.
Corollary 3. E ∈ D.
Now we are ready to show the equivalence of operating on the frontier of the equilib-
rium set through the APS operator B and operating on the maximum equilibrium surplus
function through T∗.
Lemma 5. SBW (p) = T∗SW (p) for all p.
Proof. It suffices to show that, for any belief p
• The maximum sum of payoffs in BW (p) decomposed by L, if it exists, is equal to
TLS
W (p). If no payoffs in BW (p) are decomposed by L we have TLSW (p) < s.
• The maximum sum of payoffs in BW (p) decomposed by H , if it exists, equals
THS
W (p) and the incentive constraint below holds.
piH(p)SW (φ+H(p)) + (1− piH(p))SW (φ−H(p)) ≥ s+
1− δ
δ
c (5)
If no payoffs in BW (p) are decomposed by H we have either THSW (p) < s or the
incentive constraint (5) does not hold.
Let p ∈ [0, 1]. The maximum sum of payoffs in BW (p) decomposed by e, if it exists, is
given by TeSW (p); the effort pins down the flow payoff as the wage transfer cancels out and
maximality implies that the players share the maximum future surplus, as higher payoffs
do not hurt incentives. Moreover, in the case of e = H , Lemma 4 states that this maximum
sum of payoffs can be achieved by setting continuation payoffs ui = SW (φiH(p)) − u for
i ∈ {+,−}. Therefore, the incentive constraint
piH(p)u+ + (1− piH(p))u− ≥ u+ 1− δ
δ
c
becomes equivalent to (5).
Hence, it remains to show that when TeSW (p) ≥ s, and, in the case of e = H , (5)
holds, there exist payoffs in BW (p) decomposed by effort e. This can be achieved by
setting continuation payoffs vi = v and ui = S(φie(p))− v for all i and adjusting the wage
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to ensure that each player receives at least his outside option. In the case of e = H , this
composition of continuation payoffs implies that (5) is equivalent to the incentive constraint
for effort. This completes the proof.
Now we have all the ingredients to the proof of Lemma 1.
Proof of Lemma 1. Since E ∈ D and S ≡ SE , Lemma 5 and Proposition 8 imply S(p) =
T∗S(p) for all p. Thus, S is a fixed point of T∗.
Let f : [0, 1]→ R be a bounded function satisfying f ≥ S and f ≥ T∗f and W0(p) =
{(u, v) ≥ (u, v)|u + v ≤ f(p)} for all p. Hence, W0 ∈ D. Lemma 5 and f ≥ T∗f
imply W0(p) ⊇ BW0(p), whereas f ≥ S implies that W0(p) ⊇ E(p) for all p. Thus, W0
satisfies the conditions in Proposition 9. In the notation of Proposition 9, we have Wn ∈ D
for all n by an inductive application of Lemma 3. Thus, SWn(p) = T n∗ SW0(p) for all n
and p by Lemma 5. Since E ∈ D and Wn(p) converges to E(p) for all p, we have that
limn→∞ SWn(p) = S(p) for every p. Moreover, Wn(p) ⊇ Wn+1(p) implies T n∗ f ≥ T n+1∗ f .
Finally, we can take f = G since the equilibrium cannot improve upon the efficient
outcome (G ≥ S) and G = max{THG, TLG, s} ≥ T∗G.
Proofs from Section 5.1
Proof of Proposition 2. Rearranging
G(pFB) = s = (1− δ)(RH(pFB)− c) + δEH [G(pFB)]
we obtain
(1− δ)c = (1− δ)(RH(pFB)− s) + δ(EH [G(pFB)]− s). (6)
Consider the application of T∗ to G. If RH(pFB) ≤ s, (6) implies
δ(EH [G(pFB)]− s) ≥ (1− δ)c
so the incentive constraint in the definition of T∗ is satisfied at all beliefs p ≥ pFB. Hence,
T∗G(p) = max{THG(p), TLG(p), s} = G(p) for all p ≥ pFB. Moreover, s ≤ T∗G(p) ≤
G(p) = s for all p ≤ pFB. Hence, T∗G = G. The algorithmic part of Lemma 1 implies
S = G so relational contracts are not inefficient.
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If, instead, piH(pFB) > s, (6) implies
δ(EH [G(pFB)]− s) < (1− δ)c.
By continuity of G and the belief updates φ+H and φ
+
L , the above strict inequality holds for
some p > pFB, at which the incentive constraint for H is not satisfied. Then T∗G(p) =
max{TLG(p), s}. Since G(p) = THG(p) > TLG(p), Lemma 1 implies S(p) < G(p).
Hence, relational contracts are inefficient.
Proofs from Section 5.2
To prove Proposition 3 we first establish some properties of S similar to, but weaker than,
the properties of G in Proposition 1.
Lemma 6. S is increasing and upper semicontinuous with S(0) = s and S(1) = RH(1)−c.
There exists a unique belief p∗ ∈ (0, 1] such that S(p) = s for p < p∗ and S(p) > s for
p > p∗.
Proof. The upper semicontinuity of S follows directly from the upper hemicontinuity of
E established in Corollary 2. We now turn to establishing that S is increasing. Since G is
increasing, Lemma 1 implies it is sufficient to show that T∗ maps increasing functions to
increasing functions. Let f be one such function. Notice that the incentive constraint for
H in the definition of T∗f can be rewritten as h(p) ≥ A where A is a constant and h is
increasing and usc. Moreover, other things equal, T∗f is larger if the incentive constraint is
satisfied. Hence, it is sufficient to show THf and TLf are increasing and usc. This follows
directly from the fact that f has the same properties.
The algorithmic part of Lemma 1 also implies that the values of S at 0 and 1 can be
found by showing that T∗G(0) = s and T∗G(1) = RH(1) − c. The former follows from
s ≤ T∗G(0) ≤ TG(0) = G(0) = s, while the latter is a consequence of Assumption 3.
Since RH(1) − c > s, the monotonicity of S implies there exists a maximal belief p∗
such that S(p) = s if p < p∗ and S(p) = max{THS(p), TLS(p)} if p ≥ p∗. That p∗ is
unique follows from the strict monotonicity of THS, TLS and h.
Next, we establish that the three-region structure in Proposition 3 is obtained if the
surplus function exhibits a monotone policy.
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Lemma 7. If S exhibits a monotone policy there exist beliefs p, p¯ such that
S(p) =

s if p < p
TLS(p) if p ≤ p < p¯
THS(p) if p ≥ p¯
Proof. By Lemma 6 there is a threshold belief p∗ such that the players take their outside
options at beliefs p < p∗ and interact if p ≥ p∗. The monotonicity of S implies that if
the incentive constraint is satisfied at some belief it is satisfied for all higher beliefs. Let
pIC be the minimum belief at which the incentive constraint for H is satisfied. Note that
such a belief exists due to S(1) = RH(1)− c and the infimum is attained due to the upper
semicontinuity of S. Hence, T∗f(p) = THf(p) iff p ≥ max{p∗, pIC}. Putting p = p∗ and
p¯ = max{p∗, pIC} completes the proof.
The final piece of the proof of Proposition 3 is the following lemma which ensures that
the monotone policy property is preserved under T∗.
Lemma 8. Let f be an increasing function that exhibits a monotone policy. Then T∗f is
increasing and exhibits a monotone policy.
Proof. The proof of Lemma 6 showed that T∗f is increasing when f is increasing. Hence,
there exists a maximal belief p∗ such that T∗f(p) = s ∀p < p∗. It remains to show that T∗f
exhibits a monotone policy. Let p ∈ [0, 1]. We will show that TH(T∗f)(p) > TL(T∗f)(p).
We examine two cases depending on where the posterior beliefs lie relative to the cutoff p∗.
Firstly, if p∗ > φ−L(p), we have T∗f(φ−L(p)) = s. Also, φ−L ≥ φ−H implies that
T∗f(φ−H(p)) = s since T∗f is increasing. Hence,
TH(T∗f)(p)− TL(T∗f)(p)
≥(1− δ)(RH(p)− c) + δ[piH(p)T∗f(φ+H(p)) + (1− piH(p))s]
− (1− δ)RL(p)− δ[piL(p)T∗f(φ+L(p)) + (1− piL(p))s]
≥(1− δ)(RH(p)− c−RL(p)) > 0.
where the second inequality follows fromRH(p) > RL(p) and T∗f(φ+H(p)) ≥ T∗f(φ+L(p)) ≥
s.
Secondly, suppose p∗ ≤ φ−L(p). Then T∗f(q′) ∈ {THf(q′), TLf(q′)} for any q′ ∈
{φ+L(p), φ−L(p)} which implies T∗f(q′) ≤ THf(q′) since f exhibits a monotone policy.
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Thus, TL(T∗f)(p) ≤ TL(THf)(p) and it follows that
TH(T∗f)(p)− TL(T∗f)(p)
≥TH(TLf)(p)− TL(THf)(p)
=(1− δ)(RH(p)− c) + δ(1− δ)(EH [RL(p)]) + δ2EH,L[f(p)]
−
(
(1− δ)(RL(p)) + δ(1− δ)(EL[RH(p)− c]) + δ2EL,H [f(p)]
)
=(1− δ)(RH(p)− c) + δ(1− δ)RL(p)
−
(
(1− δ)(RL(p)− c) + δ(1− δ)(RH(p)− c)
)
=(1− δ)2(RH(p)− c−RL(p)) > 0
where
Ee1,e2 [f(p)] = pie1(p)Ee2 [f(pi+e1(p))] + (1− pie1(p))Ee2 [f(pi−e1(p))]
for any e1, e2 ∈ {H,L}. This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3. We know from Lemma 1 that S = limn→∞Gn where Gn = T n∗ G.
Since G is increasing and exhibits a monotone policy (Proposition 1), Lemma 8 implies
that Gn exhibits a monotone policy for all n. Taking limits yields THS(p) ≥ TLS(p) for
all p, so S exhibits a monotone policy. Lemma 7 completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4. Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that p = p¯. Consider some
belief p = p¯ − ε for some small ε > 0. It suffices to show that L generates more surplus
than the outside options.
We know that S(φ+L(p)) ≥ S(p¯) whenever ε is small enough. So the joint surplus from
L at belief p is at least
(1− δ)RL(p) + δ
[
piL(p)S(p¯) + (1− piL(p))s
]
≥(1− δ)RL(p) + δ
[
piL(p)
(
(1− δ)RH(p¯) + δs
)
+ (1− piL(p))s
]
=(1− δ)RL(p) + δ
[
piL(p)(1− δ)
(
RH(p¯)− s
)
+ s
]
=s+ (1− δ)
[
RL(p)− s+ δpiL(p)(RH(p¯)− s)
]
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This exceeds s whenever
RL(0)− s+ δpiL(0)(RH(0)− s) ≥ 0
as required.
Proofs from Section 6
Proof of Theorem 1. Any limit in this proof is taken as k →∞.
We begin with some preliminaries regarding the efficient solution, which are a direct
consequence of Proposition 1. For any k, define G+k (p) := Gk(φ+H,k(p)) and G−k (p) :=
Gk(φ−H,k(p)). We have that p ≥ pFBk if and only if
(1− δk)(RH(p)− c) + δk
[
pikH(p)G+k (p) + (1− pikH(p))s
]
≥ s
which can be rearranged as
δkpi
k
H(p)
(1− δk)(G
+
k (p)− s) ≥ s− (RH(p)− c) (7)
and (7) holds at equality if p = pFBk . SinceGk is increasing, convex andGk(p) ≥ RH(p)−c,
each subgradient of Gk at any p is bounded above by RH(1) − RH(0). Hence, the family
(Gk) is equicontinuous and, by the Arzela-Ascoli theorem, it has a subsequence which
converges uniformly. In what follows, we will assume that this is the original subsequence
and use G to denote the limiting function.23 In addition, notice that RH(1) − c > s and
Gk(p) ≥ RH(p)− c for all p, k imply that pFB∗ < 1 and G(p) > s for some p < 1.
In the optimal relational contract, the following incentive constraint holds:
δk
(
pikH(p¯k)(S+k (p¯k)− s) + (1− pikH(p¯k))(S−k (p¯k)− s)
)
≥ (1− δk)c
where S+k (p) := Sk(φ+H,k(p)) and S−k (p) := Sk(φ−H,k(p)). A sufficient condition is
δkpi
k
H(p¯k)
(
S+k (p¯k)− s
)
≥ (1− δk)c. (8)
Lemma 6 and Helly’s selection theorem imply that (Sk) has a subsequence which con-
23This is without loss of generality, since the only properties of the sequence we will need are pFBk → pFB∗
and p¯k → p¯∗, which hold at any subsequence.
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verges pointwise to some function S. Without loss of generality, we take the subsequence
to be the original sequence.
We continue by describing the relationship between both parts of Assumption 4 and
lim Var
k
H(p)
1−δk . The variance of the posterior at prior p can be expressed as
VarkH(p) =
(
p(1− p)
)2 (γkH − βkH)2
pikH(p)(1− pikH(p))
.
where
γkH − βkH
pikH(p)
= 1
p+ 1
γk
H
βk
H
−1
and
γkH − βkH
1− pikH(p)
= 11
1− 1−γ
k
H
1−βk
H
− p. (9)
Suppose both parts of Assumption 4 hold. Then the limits of γ
k
H−βkH
pikH(p)
and γ
k
H−βkH
1−pikH(p)
are
finite for all interior p. Hence lim Var
k
H(p)
1−δk =∞. In addition, Bayesian updating necessitates
that 0 < lim inf pikH(p) ≤ lim sup pikH(p) < 1 for all p.
Suppose Assumption 4(a), holds, but Assumption 4(b) does not. Then (9) implies that
γkH−βkH
pikH(p)
converges to a finite limit for all interior p. Moreover, Bayes rule implies pikH(p)→ 0
for all interior p, which implies βkH → 0. Hence, lim Var
k
H(p)
1−δk is finite for all interior p iff the
limit of
γkH − βkH
1− δk =
γkH
1− δk
(
1− β
k
H
γkH
)
= 1− β
k
H
1− δk
(
1− 1− γ
k
H
1− βkH
)
(10)
is finite. Let pi∗ = lim γ
k
H
1−δk . Hence, lim
VarkH(p)
1−δk is finite for all interior p iff pi
∗ is finite iff
lim pi
k
H(p)
1−δk is finite for all p.
If Assumption 4(b) holds but Assumption 4(a) does not hold, (9) implies that γ
k
H−βkH
1−pikH(p)
converges to a finite limit for all interior p. Bayes rule implies pikH(p) → 1 for all p and
βkH → 1. Hence, lim Vark(p)1−δk is finite iff lim
γkH−βkH
1−δk is finite iff lim
1−βkH
1−δk is finite (see (10)).
We proceed to give separate proofs for the cases when parts (a) and (b) of Assumption 4
hold.
Proof of Theorem 1 under Assumption 4(a). Suppose Assumption 4(a) holds. The
preliminary arguments establish that, if Assumption 4(b) holds, lim Var
k
H(p)
1−δk =∞ for all in-
terior p and pi∗ =∞ since the probability of success is bounded below. If Assumption 4(b)
does not hold, (i) holds iff pi∗ is finite. Hence, we conclude that (i) holds iff pi∗ is finite,
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regardless of whether Assumption 4(b) holds.
(i) ⇒ (ii), (iii): Suppose pi∗ is finite and pFB∗ = 0. Then the RHS of (7) converges to
s−RH(0) + c, which is positive by Assumption 1. Hence, when pi∗ is finite, we can show
pFB∗ > 0 by showing that the LHS of (7) at pFBk converges to 0. This implies p¯∗ > 0.
If lim γ
k
H
βkH
< ∞, φ+H,k(pFBk ) → 0, and, by the uniform convergence of (Gk), we have
G+k (pFBk )→ s. Since pi∗ is finite, this implies that the LHS of (7) at pFBk converges to 0.
If lim γ
k
H
βkH
= ∞, the finiteness of pi∗ implies that lim βkH1−δk = 0. Thus,
pikH(p)
1−δk → ppi∗ for
all p. It follows that the LHS of (7) converges to 0, as required.
(i) ⇒ (iv): Suppose pi∗ is finite, RH(pFB∗ ) > s, and p¯∗ = pFB∗ . There exist ε > 0 and
K1 such that
δkpi
k
L(pFB∗ + ε)
1− δk
(
Sk(φ+L,k(pFB∗ + ε))− s
)
≤δkpi
k
H(pFB∗ + ε)
1− δk
(
Gk(φ+L,k(pFB∗ + ε))− s
)
≤ lim δkpi
k
H(pFBk )
1− δk
(
Gk(φ+L,k(pFBk ))− s
)
+ ε
≤s− (RH(pFB∗ )− c) + ε
<s−RL(pFB∗ + ε).
for all k ≥ K1. The first inequality follows from Sk ≤ Gk and Assumption 1.The second
inequality holds for any ε > 0 small enough due to three limit results: Gk(φ+L,k(pFBk )) →
G(φ+L,k(pFB∗ )), lim
pikH(p
FB
k )
1−δk = lim
pikH(p
FB∗ )
1−δk < ∞, and δk → 1. The first follows from the
uniform convergence of φ+L,k, and the uniform convergence of (Gk) to G. Towards the
second limit, notice that
pikH(p) = βkH
(
1− p+ pγ
k
H
βkH
)
so Assumption 4(a) implies that limk pi
k
H(p
FB
k )
pikH(p
FB∗ )
= 1. Since pi∗ is finite, limk pi
k
H(p
FB∗ )
1−δk exists,
giving the desired result. The penultimate equality follows from (7) and φ+L,k ≤ φ+H,k. The
final inequality is a result of Assumption 1 for an appropriate choice of ε.
The resulting inequality can be rearranged to show
(1− δk)
(
RL(p)− s)
)
+ δk
(
pikL(p)Sk(φ+L,k(p)) + (1− pikL(p))s
)
< s
for all p ≤ pFB∗ + ε, k ≥ K1. (11)
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Let K2 be such that p¯k < pFB∗ + ε for all k ≥ K2 and let K = max{K1, K2}. Suppose
that there is a region where L is used in an optimal relational contract for some k ≥ K.
By Proposition 3 there exists p ≤ pFB∗ + ε, at which the surplus from L is no less than s
and Sk(φ−L,k(p)) = s. This is a contradiction to (11). Hence, for all k ≥ K, the optimal
relational contract does not use L and the incentive constraint implies
lim
k→∞
δkpi
k
H(p¯k)
1− δk (G
+
k (p¯k)− s) ≥ c (12)
Since pi∗ is finite, δkpi
k
H(p¯k)
1−δk converges to a finite number. Hence, the uniform convergence of
(Gk) and (7) imply that the LHS of (12) converges to s− (RH(pFB∗ )− c). A contradiction
to RH(pFB∗ ) > s. Hence, we conclude that pFB∗ < p¯∗.
(ii) ⇒ (i): Suppose pi∗ = ∞. We want to show that pFB∗ = 0. Let pˆ = sup{p|G(p) =
s} < 1. Suppose for a contradiction, that pˆ > 0. By Assumption 4 there exists ε > 0 such
that φ+H,k(pˆ− ε) ≥ pˆ+ ε for all k large enough. Hence, G+k (pˆ− ε) ≥ s+ η for some η > 0.
Then (7) implies pFBk ≤ pˆ− ε for high k and it follows that
Gk(p) = (1− δk)(RH(p)− c) + δk
[
pik(p)G+k (p) + (1− pik(p))G−k (p)
]
Gk(p)−G−k (p)
p− φ−H,k(p)
= 1− δk
p− φ−H,k(p)
(RH(p)− c−G−k (p)) + δk
pikH(p)
p− φ−H,k(p)
(G+k (p)−G−k (p))
for any p ∈ (pˆ− ε, pˆ). Notice that
pikH(p)
p− φ−H,k(p)
= pi
k
H(p)(1− pikH(p))
p(1− p)(γkH − βkH)
.
Assumption 4(a) and (9) imply that lim pi
k
H(p)
γkH−βkH
is positive and finite. The preliminaries of
the proof show that if Assumption 4(b) holds, then 1 − pikH(p) is bounded away from 0. If
Assumption 4(b) does not hold, 1 − pikH(p) → 1 for all interior p. Hence, there exists a
constant ζ > 0 such that
1
p(1− p)ζ ≤
pikH(p)
p− φ−H,k(p)
≤ 1
p(1− p)
1
ζ
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for all interior p. Hence, pi∗ =∞ implies
lim 1− δk
p− φ−H,k(p)
= lim 1− δk
pikH(p)
pikH(p)
p− φ−H,k(p)
= 0
for all p ∈ (pˆ− ε, pˆ). Since RH(p)− c−G−k (p) is uniformly bounded, we have
lim Gk(p)−G
−
k (p)
p− φ−k (p)
= lim δk
pikH(p)
p− φ−k (p)
(G+k (p)−G−k (p))
Hence, there exists K such that for all k ≥ K and p ∈ (pˆ− ε, pˆ) we have
Gk(p)−G−k (p)
p− φ−k (p)
>
1
2ζη minp′∈[pˆ−ε,pˆ]
1
p′(1− p′) .
Consequently, there exists a constant µ > 0 such that Gk(pˆ− ε2) > s+ µ for all k ≥ K, in
contradiction to G(pˆ− ε2) = s.
We conclude that pˆ = 0. Hence, for any p > 0, there exists K such that Gk(p) > s for
all k ≥ K. It follows that pFBk → 0, as required.
(iii) ⇒ (i): Suppose pi∗ = ∞. We want to show that p¯∗ = 0. The strategy follows the
argument for (ii)⇒ (i) with some modifications.
Let pˆ = sup{p|S(p) = s}. Our first goal is to show that pˆ < 1. Let
f(p) =
s if p < p1s+ (RH(1)− c)p−p11−p1 if p ≥ p1
where p1 is large enough to ensure RH(p) − c ≥ f(p) for all p ≥ p1. Let T k∗ denote the
operator T∗ within modelMk. Consider the function T k∗ f at belief p1. Assumption 4(a)
implies there exists a constant η > 0 such that S+k (p1) ≥ s+ η for k large enough. Hence,
pi∗ = ∞ and (8) imply that the incentive constraint holds at all p ≥ p1 for high k. The
convexity of f implies that EHk [f(p)] ≥ f(p) for all such k and p, where EHk denotes the
EH operator in modelMk. Hence,
T k∗ f(p) ≥ (1− δk)(RH(p)− c) + δkEHk [f(p)] ≥ f(p).
for all p ≥ p1. It follows that T k∗ f(p) ≥ f(p) for all p ∈ [0, 1] and k large enough. Hence,
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the correspondence
W f (p) = {(u, v)|(u, v) ≥ (u, v), u+ v ≤ f(p)} for all p
is self-generating and Proposition 7 implies that Sk ≥ f for all k large enough. Hence,
pˆ < 1.
Suppose that pˆ > 0. Define ε and η as in the proof of (ii) ⇒ (i), so that S+k (pˆ − ε) ≥
s + η. Since pi∗ = ∞, the incentive constraint (8) holds for all k large enough. It follows
that p¯k ≤ pˆ − ε for high k. Replicating the remaining part of the argument for (ii) ⇒ (i)
shows that we must have pˆ = 0. It follows that p¯∗ = 0, as required.
(iv) ⇒ (i): Consider a sequence of models where all parameters, except for δk are
constant and RH(0) > s. Then pi∗ =∞, which implies p¯∗ = pFB∗ , but RH(pFB∗ ) = s. Hence
pi∗ =∞ implies that statement (iv) is false, as required.
Proof of Theorem 1 under Assumption 4(b). Suppose Assumption 4(b) holds. In
light of the previous part of the proof, we will assume without loss of generality that As-
sumption 4(a) does not hold. Then pikH(p) → 1 for all p. Let λ = lim γ
k
H−βkH
1−δk . It follows
from the preliminary discussion that (i) holds iff λ is finite iff lim 1−β
k
H
1−δk is finite. Notice that
Assumption 4(b) implies that lim 1−γ
k
H
1−δk is finite whenever lim
1−βkH
1−δk is finite.
(i)⇒ (ii), (iii): Suppose λ is finite and pFB∗ = 0. Since
φ+H,k(p)− p = p(1− p)
γkH − βkH
pikH(p)
and the bound on the subgradient of Gk implies that
G+k (pFBk )− s
φ+H,k(pFBk )− pFBk
≤ RH(1)−RH(0)
for all k, it follows that
δkpi
k
H(p)
1− δk
(
G+k (pFBk )− s
)
≤
(
RH(1)−RH(0)
)
δkp
FB
k (1− pFBk )
γkH − βkH
1− δk
≤
(
RH(1)−RH(0)
)
(λ+ ε)pFBk (1− pFBk )
for large k. Hence, pFB∗ = 0 implies that the LHS of (7) at pFBk converges to 0, while the
RHS converges to s − (RH(0) − c) > 0. A contradiction. Hence, pFB∗ > 0 and p¯∗ > 0,
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whenever λ is finite.
(i) ⇒ (iv): Suppose pFB∗ = p¯∗ = p∗ and RH(p∗) > s. There exists pˆ > p∗ such that
φ−L,k(p) < p∗ for all p ∈ [p∗, pˆ]. Hence, for k high enough, the incentive constraint at p¯k is
given by
δkpi
k
H(p¯k)
1− δk (S
+
k (p¯k)− s) ≥ c (13)
For any p ≥ p¯k, we have
S(p) = (1− δk)(RH(p)− c) + δk
[
pikH(p)S+k (p) + (1− pikH)S−k (p)
]
= S+k (p)− (1− pikH(p))(S+k (p)− S−k (p))
+ (1− δk)
(
(RH(p)− c)−
(
pikH(p)S+k (p) + (1− pikH(p))S−k (p)
))
Hence, the following holds for all k high enough:
S+k (p¯k)− s
1− δk =
1− pikH(p¯k)
1− δk (S
+
k (p¯k)− s)
− (RH(p¯k)− c) +
(
pikH(p¯k)S+k (p¯k) + (1− pikH(p¯k))s
)
. (14)
Since Assumption 4(b) does not hold, φ+H,k(p) → p for all p. Hence, the uniform conver-
gence of G implies that G+k (p¯k) → s. It follows that S+k (p¯k) → s. Since lim 1−β
k
H
1−δk and
lim 1−γ
k
H
1−δk are finite, lim
1−pikH(p¯k)
1−δk is finite. Hence, taking limits of (14), we obtain
lim δkpikH(p¯k)
S+k (p¯k)− s
1− δk = lim
S+k (p¯k)− s
1− δk = s− (RH(p∗)− c) < c
which contradicts the limit of the incentive constraint (13).
(ii) ⇒ (i): Suppose λ = ∞. Let ∆k satisfy δk = e−∆k . L’Hospital’s rule implies
γkH−βkH
∆ →∞.
Let pˆ = inf{p|G(p) > s}. Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that pˆ > 0. There
exists ε such that for all k high enough G(pˆ + ε) ≥ s + ε. Suppose the belief is pˆ− ε and
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we want to find the number of consecutive successes needed to reach pˆ+ ε. Since
φ+H,k(p)− p =
p(1− p)
pikH(p)
(γkH − βkH)
this number will be at most
N(k) = 2ε
γkH − βkH
max
p∈[pˆ−ε,pˆ+ε]
p(1− p)
pikH(p)
= ξ
γkH − βkH
for high k, where ξ is a positive constant (since pikH → 1). Consider the following policy
at pˆ − ε: in the next N(k) periods, exert H and, if failure occurs, take the outside options
in the following period. If N(k) successes occur, continue with the optimal policy at the
posterior belief, which must generate surplus of at least s + ε. For k high enough, it must
be that the value of this policy does not exceed the value of the outside options. Hence,
s ≥ δN(k)k
[
pˆik(s+ ε) + (1− pˆik)s
]
+ (RH(0)− c)(1− δN(k)k )
where pˆik is the probability of getting N(k) successes in a row, starting from pˆ − ε. The
flow payoffs during the first N(k) periods are either RH(p) − c when H is exerted, or s,
both of which are more valuable that RH(0)− c by Assumption 1. Rearranging, we obtain
(1− δN(k)k )s ≥ δN(k)k pˆikε+ (RH(0)− c)(1− δN(k)k )
We will violate this inequality for high k by showing that the LHS converges to 0, while the
RHS converges to a positive constant. This follows from two limiting results: δN(k)k → 1
and lim inf pˆik > 0. Towards the first, notice that
δ
N(k)
k = exp
(
− ∆
γkH − βkH
ξ
)
converges to 1 since γ
k
H−βkH
∆ →∞. Towards the second result, notice that
pˆik ≥
(
pikH(pˆ− ε)
)N(k)
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and let
Bk =
log
[(
pikH(pˆ− ε))
)N(k)]
ξ
=
log
[
βkH + (γkH − βkH)(pˆ− ε)
]
γkH − βkH
=
log
[
1− (1− βkH)−
(
(1− γkH)− (1− βkH)
)
(pˆ− ε)
]
(1− βkH)− (1− γkH)
Given any ε > 0 small enough, we have
(1− βkH)(λ− ε) ≤ (1− γkH) ≤ (1− βkH)(λ+ ε)
for all k high enough. Hence,
Bk ≥
log
[
1− (1− βkH)(1− (λ+ ε− 1)(pˆ− ε))
]
(1− βkH)(1− λ+ ε)
Since lim βkH = 1, L’Hospital’s rule implies
lim inf Bk ≥ −1− (λ+ ε− 1)(pˆ− ε)1− λ+ ε
Thus, we conclude that
lim inf pˆik ≥ lim inf exp(Bkξ) > 0
as required. Hence, pFB∗ = 0.
(iii) ⇒ (i): Suppose λ = ∞. Let pˆ = inf{p|S(p) > s}. We can show pˆ < 1 as in
the proof under Assumption 4(a). Suppose pˆ > 0. Define ε and N(k) as in the previous
part of the proof and recall the strategies considered at pˆ − ε: the worker exerts H for
N(k) periods, unless a failure occurs which is followed by the outside options. In the
event of N(k) consecutive successes, an efficient continuation equilibrium is played with
surplus of at least s+ε. As previously shown, these strategies create higher surplus than the
outside options for high k. Hence, it only remains to show that the incentive compatibility
constraint is satisfied in each of the initial N(k) periods. Since H is exerted only if success
occurred in all of the previous periods, the expected continuation surplus from H in excess
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of s in the n-th period is at least
δpikH(pˆ− ε)
δN(k)−nk (pikH(pˆ− ε))N(k)−nε+ (1− δN(k)−nk )(RH(0)− c− s)

which is strictly positive for k high enough. Hence, we conclude that pˆ = 0. Hence p¯∗ = 0.
(iv)⇒ (i): The proof of this part is identical to the proof under Assumption 4(b).
Proof of Proposition 5. If pi∗ = ∞, the proof of (iii) ⇒ (i) in Theorem 1 shows that
p
k
= p¯k for all k large enough. Hence, surplus above the outside options can only arise
from H and we have p¯∗ ≤ pˆ.
Suppose pi∗ is finite and let p > pˆ. Since pikH(p)→ 0, we have φ−H,k(p)→ p as k →∞.
Hence, there exists ε such that p − ε > pˆ and φ−H,k(p) > p − ε for all k large enough.
Moreover, there exists η > 0 such that Sk(p − ε) ≥ s + η for large k. This implies the
incentive constraint for H holds at p for all k large enough. Since δk → 1, the surplus
from H at p exceeds s for large k. Hence, p¯∗ ≤ p. Since p > pˆ was arbitrary, the proof is
complete.
Proofs from Section 7.1
Proof of Proposition 6. Let wh and wl be the wages upon success and failure and let E[u′]
be the expected continuation value of the worker. The worker’s incentive constraint to
choose H over L is given by
(1− δ)
[
piH(p)wh + (1− piH(p))wl − c
]
+ δE[u′] ≥ (1− δ)
[
piL(p)wh + (1− piL(p))wl
]
+ δu
(1− δ)(wh − wl)(piH(p)− piL(p)) + δ(E[u′]− u) ≥ (1− δ)c
Without limited liability, the firm can always increase the spread between wh and wl
to satisfy the above incentive constraint without affecting the expected wage payment
piH(p)wh+(1−piH(p))wl. Hence, the incentive constraint for H can be satisfied whenever
the relationship yields more surplus than s. Therefore, the equilibrium is efficient.
With limited liability, however, the firm can no longer create an arbitrary wage spread
since wh, wl ≥ u. To tackle the first case in the characterization of efficiency, suppose
RH(pFB) ≤ s. It suffices to show that H is enforceable at belief pFB when continuations
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are drawn from G. Equation (6) implies
δ
(
EH [G(pFB)]− s
)
≥ (1− δ)c
so we can set the worker’s continuation payoffs u+, u− ≥ u following success and failure
so that
δ
(
piH(pFB)(u+ − u) + (1− piH(pFB))(u− − u)
)
= (1− δ)c
which makes the continuation payoffs for the firm given by v+ = G(pi+H(pFB)) − u+ and
v− = G(pi−H(pFB)) − u− greater than or equal to v. By setting wh = wl = u the overall
payoff of the worker is u and the firm’s payoff is v since G(pFB) = s and the path of play
is the same as in the first best. Hence, all the incentive constraints for H are satisfied at pFB
and we are done.
We now show that wheneverRH(pFB) > s the incentive constraint cannot be satisfied at
pFB. Suppose, for a contradiction, that it can be satisfied. Without loss of generalitywl = u,
otherwise the difference between wages for success and failure can be increased without
affecting the expected wage while still satisfying the incentive constraint for H . Since
S(pi−H(pFB)) ≤ G(pi−H(pFB)) = s the continuation payoffs following H and failure must be
equal to the outside options. Let (u+, v+) denote the continuation payoffs following H and
success. Equation (6) and the incentive constraint for H imply
(1− δ)(piH(pFB)− piL(pFB))(wh − u) + δpiH(pFB)(u+ − u)
≥(1− δ)(RH(pFB)− s) + δ
(
EH [G(pFB)]− s
)
and we obtain
(1− δ)(piH(pFB)− piL(pFB))(wh − u) ≥ (1− δ)(RH(pFB)− s) + δpiH(pFB)(v+ − v).
(15)
Notice that RH(pFB) > s implies wh − u > 0. Now consider the firm’s payoff:
v = (1− δ)[piH(pFB)(yh − wh) + (1− piH(pFB))(yl − u)] + δ[piH(pFB)v+ + (1− piH(pFB))v]
v − v = (1− δ)[RH(pFB)− s− piH(pFB)(wh − u)] + δpiH(pFB)(v+ − v)].
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Using equation (15) we obtain
v − v ≤ −(1− δ)− piL(pFB)(wh − u)] < 0
which is a contradiction since the firm’s payoff must exceed his outside option in any
equilibrium. By continuity, the same argument can be extended to show that the incentive
constraint cannot be satisfied at some belief p > pFB so relational contracts are inefficient.
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